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Nelson: The Great Senior Short-Sale

THE GREAT SENIOR SHORT-SALE
OR WHY POLICY INERTIA WILL SHORT CHANGE
MILLIONS OF AMERICA’S SENIORS
Arthur C. Nelson*
Technically: A “short sale” is a sale of real estate in which the net proceeds fall
short of paying the debts secured by the property.
As applied: Selling one’s home for much less than one hoped, perhaps less than
its inflation adjusted purchase price, or not being able to sell at all.
This article in the Festschrift issue dedicated to Professor Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer will show that sweeping demographic changes will occur between
the late 2010s and 2040. Tens of millions of baby boomers (born between 1946 and
1964) as well as Gen-Xers (born between 1965 and 1980) will become empty
nesters and singles. Many, perhaps most of them, will want to exchange their larger
homes on a larger lots for smaller homes on smaller lots or attached homes. Tens
of millions of millennials—born between 1981 and 1997—will be forming
households with children but may not want to buy boomers’ homes, opting instead
for smaller homes on smaller lots or attached homes, especially those in walkable
communities. The newest generation—Gen Z born between 1998 and 2015—will
become starter home households seeking mostly attached homes. 1 In effect, this
article is a nearly century-long sweep of massive demographic changes affecting
housing demand between the end of World War II and the middle of the TwentyFirst century.
Is America prepared for the change ahead? (No.) Will there be a market
sufficient for millions of America’s senior households to sell their homes? (No.)
Do policies exist to facilitate the change ahead? (No.) Will policy inertia make
millions of America’s seniors worse off? (Yes.)
But first a perspective.
The eminent demographer Dowell Myers 2 often opens his presentations
asking if anyone can predict America’s economic future 10 years from then. There

1

Generation Alpha, who will be born between 2016 and about 2031, will not have a substantial
effect on housing markets until after 2040.

* Professor of Urban Planning and Real Estate Development, University of Arizona and
Presidential Professor Emeritus of City and Metropolitan Planning, University of Utah. See also
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_C._Nelson.
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are no takers. Then he asks how old everyone will be in 10 years; everyone knows
and that is the point. This rhetorical question implies volumes about policy. As
some grow older they will form households and raise children. Others will become
empty nesters. Still others will retire, move into smaller housing units, and even
pass away. These stages of life are reasonably predictable and their implications for
housing reasonably clear.3
Let us answer Professor Myers’ question in the context of America’s future
housing demand. During the 10 year period between 2020 and 2030, the number of
Americans aged 65 years and older will increase by 17 million, from 56 million to
73 million persons or 30 percent. 4 However, those 17 million people are equivalent
to 74 percent of the nation’s total population growth of 23 million people, from 333
million to 356 million.
Even more impressive are projections of households by the Harvard Joint
Center for Housing Studies over the 10-year period 2018 to 2028. 5 While the total
number of households will increase by 12 million—128 million to 140 million, 11
million or the equivalent6 of 92 percent of them will be households with
householders7 aged 65 years or more, growing from 33 million to 44 million.
Trends beyond Professor Myers’ rhetorical 10 years are more impressive as will be
shown.
I organize my discussion in three parts:




Demand, Supply and the Imminent Housing Mismatch
Too Many Homes for Too Few Buyers
Policy Inertia is not Acceptable

In the first part—Demand, Supply and the Imminent Housing Mismatch—I
open with “The Past in the Context of Emerging and Trends” where I outline big
changes to the household demographic composition of America from the end of
World War II to the 2040s. I continue by showing that “As Householders Age,
2

https://priceschool.usc.edu/people/dowell-myers/

3

For example, see Julia O. Beamish, Rosemary Carucci Goss & JoAnn Emmel, Lifestyle
Influences on Housing Preferences, HOUSING AND SOCIETY, 28:1-2, 1-28 (2001).
4

Figures are derived from WOODS & POOLE, COMPLETE ECONOMICS AND
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SOURCE 2020.
5

Jonathan Spader, TENURE PROJECTIONS OF HOMEOWNER AND RENTER
HOUSEHOLDS FOR 2018-2038 (2019).
6

I say “equivalent” because those households are mostly already living in the US.

7

A householder is a person who owns or rents a house and is otherwise considered the head of a
household. This concept is used throughout the article.
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Average Household Size Falls and This Changes the Nature of Future Housing
Demand.” For instance, going forward, senior households will actually require
more housing units than younger ones, though different kinds of housing units such
as small homes on smaller lots or attached homes. While “The Future is not the
Past”—the theme of the next section—few people grasp the magnitude of the
massive trend away from larger homes on larger lots because of demographic
trends. These trends will lead to “Glacial Demographic Changes That Will Carve
out New Housing Markets.” I say glacial because as massive as the changes in the
housing market will be over time, they will be imperceptible in any given year. I
will then show the “Nature of Current Supply” focusing on the distribution of
occupied housing units by householder age (under 35 years of age, between 45 and
64, and 65 and older) as well as household type (one or more adult person
households with and without children, and single person households). This will lead
to the “Nature of Emerging Preference Homes in for Walkable Communities”
where I will show that to about mid-century if not beyond, the entire new demand
for homes will be for those in walkable communities because of generational
differences in preferences.
The second part—Too Many Senior Homes for Too Few Younger Buyers—
presents data and preference survey results that estimates the nature and extent of
the imminent excess supply of homes owned by seniors compared to the supply of
buyers. I will start by showing that the “Sheer Number of Senior Sellers Dwarfs the
Supply of Younger Buyers.” This is despite what I call “The Misguided
Romanticism of Aging in Place.” If seniors can hold off selling their homes, the
argument goes, the potential glut of seniors selling their homes can be attenuated
as younger generations replace older ones. This is unlikely. While we may fantasize
about living in our home the rest of our lives, our home can become our prison. I
will distinguish between aging-in-place voluntarily and aging-in-place
involuntarily. One reason that seniors may choose to age-in-place involuntarily is
that “Millennials on the Sidelines.” It is not that Millennials or Gen-Zers do not
want to buy homes, it is that the home buying system is rigged against them. Even
so, would younger generations even want to buy homes owned by boomers and
Gen Xers? This question is made even more poignant in “Mismatch between
Supply and Demand by Housing Type” where I will show that by 2038 there may
be as many as 18 million more homes on large lots than the market wants. Agingin-place or not, the sheer number of seniors leaving their homes will simply overrun
the number of younger generation buyers. But these dire outcomes will not occur
everywhere. There will be a “Geographic Mismatch” meaning that some areas will
suffer far more than others, yet some areas will easily absorb homes offered for sale
by seniors.
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The third part—Policy Inertia is not Acceptable—argues that doing nothing
is not an option for the harm it will inflict on millions of America’s seniors. It 8of
the imminent senior short sale calamity. Therein lies the problem: these policies
need to be implemented soon because getting ahead of glacial demographic change
requires time. While I worry that aging in place romanticism is misguided, “Make
Aging in Place Work” is plausible in some situations. It requires in part leveraging
the housing market itself to make aging in place financially feasible. This leads to
“Right-Sizing Housing Supply in Growing Markets” where I outline ways in which
the under-supply of needed housing is produced in places where there is market
demand. In contrast, in vast swaths of America, “Right-Sizing Weak Markets” is
needed, perhaps more desperately. I have mentioned that home ownership is
stacked against younger generations, we need to “Rethink Mortgage
Underwriting.” After all, if part of the problem leading to the great senior sell-off
is the dearth of younger home buyers because of post Great Recession era mortgage
underwriting constraints, sensible relaxation of underwriting standards may help if
done in ways that are smart.
I proceed to Part 1, which starts with a basic lesson in economics.
Part 1: Demand, Supply and the Imminent Housing Mismatch
The study of economics is about the relationship between demand for a
good or service, and its supply. The greater the demand relative to supply, the
higher the price. If the mismatch is large, “excess” profits are earned—excess
meaning profits over and above the normal rate of return needed to sustain an
enterprise. In a competitive market, excess profits are reinvested to increase supply
and lower costs. At some point, equilibrium is achieved where supply is
commensurate with demand with respect costs of production including normal
profits. The reverse is also true. If demand slackens in the face of increasing supply,
prices must fall but if prices fall too much, firms leave the market—perhaps going
bankrupt. If demand is negative, prices tend to chase the market down, even to
below zero. In housing markets, the result is lower costs, higher vacancy rates, and
overall disinvestment in the market—and likely foreclosures and bankruptcies. Of
course there are complications. In a growing market, prices can rise for favored
housing but fall for disfavored kinds. These demand and supply relationships with
respect to housing will be reviewed in this part. I will begin by comparing housing
market situations of that past with emerging trends. I will then show that housing
demand is shifting away from homes serving the needs of households with children
8

These numbers are adapted from Laurie Goodman, Rolf Pendall and Jun Zhu, HEADSHIP AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? (2015).
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to non-child and single person households. I will note that housing markets change
slowly, almost glacially, but also unquestionably. Added to the mix is that each
successive generation seems to have its own housing preferences that are not
always the same as prior ones. This can lead to a mismatch between current housing
supply and the emerging demand for housing; this is especially the case with respect
to increasing demand for homes in walkable communities.
The Past in the Context of Emerging Trends
A large part of America’s household demographic changes have their root
in the “Baby Boom.” “Boomers” were born between 1946 and 1964. In 1946, there
were about 141 million Americans. With more than 76 million babies born during
this period, boomer babies increased the population by more than half (54 percent)
of the 1946 population. No generation before or since has been as large
proportionate to the base year of the generation. In contrast, as illustrated in Figure
1, the 54 million babies comprising Gen X increased the base by 28 percent or
barely more than a quarter while the 67 million babies comprising the Millennial 9
generation increased their base by about 29 percent.10
America’s households, and along with it housing demand, swelled by 18
million (from 38 million to 56 million), nearly doubling the number of households
and making it the largest numerical and percentage increase during any comparable
period in the nation’s history.11 Cities at the time were unable to meet this
unprecedented demand in such a short period of time. For their part, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association, or
Fannie Mae, both founded during the 1930s under the Roosevelt Administration,
had honed their housing finance apparatuses to make home mortgage financing
9

These numbers are adapted from Laurie Goodman, Rolf Pendall and Jun Zhu, HEADSHIP AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? (2015).
10

The idea of giving a label to any generation began with the baby boom but even then labeling
future generations was not common until about the 1990s. “Gen X” was assigned arbitrarily to
those born afterward while “Gen Y” was assigned to those born after Gen X. Yet, while there is
consensus on the baby boom generation period, there is little consensus on when Gen X stopped
(somewhere between 1979 and 1982) or where Gen Y started or ended (somewhere between 1995
and 1999). Moreover, while the term Gen Y was used for more than a decade, popular media
renamed it the “millennial” generation even though none of them were actually born in the 21 st
century. Arguably, Gen Z should be the millennial generation since it was born substantially in the
21st century and the label for Gen Y should never have been changed. Such is the non-logical
power of media.
11

This claim is based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, 1890-1930, U.S. Census of Population:
1950, Vol. IV, Special Reports, General Characteristics of Families; 1940-1998, Current
Population Reports, Series P-20, Nos. 176 and 251; and Current Population Reports, Series P20515.
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accessible and efficient.12 In addition, newly formed households wanted something
different: safer places than cities were perceived to be, open spaces, clean air,
healthier environments, yards for children to play in, and new homes with modern
appliances. For their part, suburban communities were poised to accommodate the
needs of millions of baby boom households.13 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1956 which poured trillions of dollars into new highways within and between
metropolitan areas and the Clean Water Act of 1972 which financed hundreds of
billions of dollars in water treatment facilities facilitated the suburbanization of
America.14 The term “growth machine” is used to characterize a socio-politicaleconomic coalition of developers, property owners, contractors, labor, financial
institutions, and others who benefitted from suburban growth during this period of
time. 15 By 1970, suburbs had more people than central cities.
When boomers grew up and formed households of their own, they typically
chose to settle in the landscapes with which they were familiar: suburbs. Because
they also enjoyed unprecedented incomes and housing finance options, boomers
led the national wave to home ownership which peaked at 69% in 2005. The height
of the boomer-driven surge in housing demand, especially for owner-occupied
single family detached homes, occurred during the period 1990 through 2010. 16
Between those years, the housing demand for mostly boomer households with
children accounted for 82 percent of the market for new housing. Indeed, to meet

12

Before the Great Depression, homes were purchased typically with half down and balance paid
over five years. The FHA and Fannie Mae made it possible to finance homes over 20 years with as
little as 20% down. FHA actually allowed smaller down payments but this required paying
mortgage insurance to guarantee the mortgage lender that the mortgage would be honored if the
borrow failed to make the payments. Fannie Mae played a special, unique role in this. Because
banks have limited assets, they could quickly run out of money to make mortgages. Fannie Mae
solved this by buying the mortgages (called “paper”) from the banks thereby infusing banks with
more money to lend. Fannie Mae got the money it needed to buy the paper from people (often
wealthy families) and firms who lent it money with repayment guaranteed by the “full faith and
credit” of the federal government. This housing finance model transformed international finance.
13

Duany, Andres, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck. SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE
OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000). New York: North
Point Press.
14

See Arthur C. Nelson, RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2013).

15

Molotch, Harvey. 1976. The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 82(2): 309-332.
16

Although the Great Recession of 2008-2009 led to millions of foreclosures, the aftermath of the
Great Recession was not realized fully until the early 2010s.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/28

478

Nelson: The Great Senior Short-Sale

this demand, 85 percent of all new homes built were single family detached
homes.17
The past does not predict the future especially when it comes to
demographic trends. Instead, demographic analysis can predict the nature of future
housing needs as will be shown next.

Figure 1
Generation shares of population base
Source: Adapted from Urban Institute (2015).

17

Housing change figures for 1990 and 2000 are based on the Census of Housing while the share
of housing built on detached lots is based on the American Housing Survey for 1991 and 2011.
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As Householders Age, Average Household Size Falls and This Changes the Nature
of Future Housing Demand
Housing demand is driven by many elements but the chief non-economic
reasons are householder age and average household size.
Consider first household size by householder age which is illustrated in
Figure 2.18 I create four groups of households. The youngest are starter home
households where householders are under 30 years of age. They are dominated by
singles and young couples usually without children, and average about 2.5 persons
per occupied residential unit.
Next are households in the peak housing space part of the household life
cycle. These are households with children, often including children returning to or
staying in home longer than in the past.19 These households typically want larger
homes and larger lots.20 Householders range from 30 to 49 years of age with
average household size peaking at about 3.4 persons.
Empty nesting households with householders ranging about 50 to 64 years
of age, are often those that do not move soon after their children leave. Their
household size ranges about 2.30 persons or about the size of starter home
households. 21
Then, there are downsizing households whose children have left and adults
are decoupling for various reasons. These households are often looking to downsize
into smaller homes on smaller lots, often in locations more accessible to services
than their current homes. Average household size is below 2.0 persons and even
below 1.5 persons among householders over 80 years of age. Unfortunately for
many millions of them, and society as a whole, they choose to “age in place” even
when they should not for reasons discussed later. What this means is that as
boomers age and as the population of new generations is lagging as a share of total
population, the nation’s supply of empty nesting and downsizing households will
18

Analysis is based on the Current Population Survey’s (CPS), America’s Families and Living
Arrangements: 2016, retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps2016.html. Though these data are from 2016 the household sizes for individual householder age
groups has not changed much from the 2010 census.
19

Jonathan Vespa, Jobs, Marriage and Kids Come Later in Life, retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/08/young-adults.html.
20

Id., RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA.

21

Readers will notice that later analysis defines starter home households as those with
householders under 35 years of age, peak housing demand households as those with householders
between 35 and 64 years of age, and downsizing households as those with householders age 65
years and older.
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dominate the housing market well into the 2030s and 2040s. The nature of housing
demand going forward will be nothing like the past.

Figure 2
Average household size by householder age with respect to household life
stage
Source: Adapted from America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, Table
AVG1. Average Number of People Per Household, By Race And Hispanic
Origin, Marital Status, Age, And Education Of Householder: 2016.
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The Future is not the Past
It goes without saying that the future is not the past yet one wonders when
it comes to perspectives of public policy makers and even real estate analysts.
In 2020, America had about 120 million occupied housing units, adding a
little more than one million units per year since 2010. In the best years, during the
middle 2000s, America added about two million homes annually. Counting
replacements for homes destroyed or demolished each year, about 1.5 million new
homes have been needed since the Great Recession;22 it would seem that new
housing supply is lagging demand.
At the same time the nature of housing demand changes. The kinds of
homes built in the 1960s were out of fashion in the 1980s which in turn were out of
fashion in the 2000s which went out of fashion in the 2020s. The reason is changing
demographics—few senior households need or want “McMansions,” 23 and
changing preferences—as will be shown later, the market increasingly favors
walkable communities. I will address both challengers here in the context of
changing housing supply to meet demand in growing markets with special reference
to senior households.
At its heart, housing demand is a function of household size and income.
Larger households need more space than smaller ones, and if they can afford larger
homes they will buy them. The combination of larger homes and larger lots also
means looking farther into the countryside where land is abundant and cheap. This
leads to “urban sprawl”24 which I characterize as the inefficient use of land relative
22

Actually, because the nation is producing about one million homes per year but the need is 1.5
million homes annually, there is a growing backlog of demand resulting in declining vacancy
rates, increasing prices and rents, and more households occupying the same unit. Some have
argued that the nation needs to increase housing production to two million homes per year to about
2050. See Paul Emrath, MORE NEW HOMES NEEDED TO REPLACE OLDER STOCK
(2018), National Association of Home Builders. Retrieved March 23, 2020 from
https://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=263243.
23

WIKIPEDIA characterizes “McMansion is a pejorative term for a large "mass-produced"
dwelling, often constructed with low-quality materials and craftsmanship, using a mishmash of
architectural symbols to evoke connotations of wealth or taste.” They are usually on larger lots—
often one-half acre or more, comprising more than 3,000 square feet of living area, and often more
bathrooms than bedrooms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McMansion.
24

The ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA describes urban sprawl, or simply sprawl, as “the rapid
expansion of the geographic extent of cities and towns, often characterized by low-density
residential housing, single-use zoning, and increased reliance on the private automobile for
transportation. Urban sprawl is caused in part by the need to accommodate a rising urban
population; however, in many metropolitan areas it results from a desire for increased living space
and other residential amenities. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McMansion
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to demand that is facilitated by externalities and inefficient public facility pricing. 25
What happens when demand changes fundamentally such as when tens of millions
of homes are built to meet the needs of one generation but do not meet the needs of
the next? To help answer this, I divide the housing market crudely into three generic
types:


Starter home households where householders are under 35 years of age
who demand apartment, townhouse, condominium, and smaller
home/smaller lot housing;



Peak demand households where householders are between 35 and 64
years of age who demand larger homes (including McMansions) on
larger lots; and



Downsizing households where householders are 65 years of age or older
who demand smaller homes on smaller lots, various attached forms.

I then estimate the change in the number of households for each category
for the equal 30-year intervals of 1980 to 2010, and 2010 to 2040. I chose the period
1980 to 2010 because 1980 was when older boomers were in their early to middle
30s while 2010 was the year before boomers began turning 65 (in 2011) thereby
becoming seniors, and the end of the Great Recession of 2007-2009. I chose the
end year of 2040 because the youngest boomers would be in their 70s and nearly
all Gen Xers would be considered seniors. Results are reported in Table 1 and
illustrated in Figure 3.
Table 1 shows some startling trends that are illustrated in Figure 3:


Between 1980 and 2010, 28 million or three quarters (75 percent) of the
change on demand for housing were attributable to households in their
peak housing demand period. Yet, between 2010 and 2040, there will
be an increase of fewer than seven million peak housing demand
households and they will account for less than a fifth (19 percent) of the
peak housing demand. (See highlighted figures in Table 10 for the row
labeled “35-64 (Peak)”.) In other words, the period 2010 to 2040 will
see 21 million fewer peak housing demand households than seen during
the period 1980 to 2010.



In contrast, whereas downsizing households (mostly parents of
boomers) grew by nine million or 24 percent between 1980 and 2010,

25

See Arthur C. Nelson and James B. Duncan, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (1995).

Published by Reading Room, 2020

483

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 28

they will grow by 26 million between 2010 and 2040, accounting for 77
percent of the change. (See highlighted figures in Table 10 for the row
labeled “>64 (Downsizing)”.) Put differently, the period 2010 to 2040
will see 17 million more downsizing households than seen during the
period 1980 to 2010.


In all three years (1980, 2010, 2040), younger “starter home”
households comprised about 25 to 26 million of all households but they
accounted for very small shares of the change in households between
periods.

Clearly, as demographics change, so will the nature of America’s future
housing market. Put differently, if nearly 80 percent of the future demand for
housing will be driven by seniors downsizing their homes, we cannot repeat the
past where quarters of all new homes built are for larger households looking for
housing and yard space. Indeed, changes are already evident as will be seen next.

Table 1
Change in Households by Householder Age and Demand Category, 19802010 and 2010-2040
Householder
Age and
House- House- Change Share House- Change Share Change
Housing Type holds
holds
1980- 1980- holds
2010- 2010- Between
Category
1980
2010
2010 2010
2040
2040 2040 Periods
<35 (Starter)

25,073

25,490

417

1%

26,718

1,228

35-64 (Peak)
>64
(Downsizing)

39,159

66,778

27,619

75%

73,358

6,580

16,544

25,270

8,726

24%

51,383

26,113

Total

80,776

117,538

36,762

151,459

33,921

4%

811

19% (21,039)
77%

17,387
(2,841)

Note: “<” means less than and “>” means greater than.
Source: Data for 1980 and 2010 from the Current Population Survey of the
Census Bureau. Data for 2040 extrapolated from Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies, UPDATED HOUSEHOLD GROWTH PROJECTIONS: 20182028 AND 2028-2038.
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Figure 3
Housing demand by starter home, peak demand, and downsizing households
between 1980 and 2010, and between 2010 and 2040
Note: Percentages are shares of change within each time period.
Source: Data for 1980 and 2010 from the Current Population Survey of the
Census Bureau. Data for 2040 extrapolated from Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies, UPDATED HOUSEHOLD GROWTH PROJECTIONS: 20182028 AND 2028-2038.

Housing supply is notoriously slow to change. For one thing, the typical
home built since World War II lasts on average about 150 to 200 years. 26 (In
contrast, many types of nonresidential structures last just 20 years, or less, with an
average of about 45 years.27) For another, the nation loses less than half of one
percent of its housing stock annually meaning that in recent years the nation’s
growth in households exceeds both new home construction and homes lost through
26

See Arthur C. Nelson, RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2013).

27

Arthur C. Nelson, RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2013).
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fire, flooding, removal for redevelopment and other forms of demolition.28 In other
words, for the most part, the housing market is not capable of adapting quickly to
changes in demand associated with demographic, economic or other changes.
That said, changes are afoot as seen from American Housing Survey (AHS)
data for 2011 and 2017, the most recent year for which data were available for this
article. The year 2011 was chosen because (a) the AHS is published every odd year,
(b) it is the first full year of recovery after the Great Recession of 2007-2009, and
(c) it is the first year in which boomers began turning 65. Table 2 shows that the
distribution of occupied housing by attached and detached types is changing
remarkably, in these ways:


Single family detached units accounted for just 44 percent of the net
change in share of occupied housing units between 2011 and 2017 or
roughly about the half the rate seen during the 2000s;



While attached units gained 59 percent share (as manufactured home
share fell three percent), townhouses and structure with more than five
units (typically apartment and condominium buildings) each accounted
for 58 percent of the net change among attached units; but



There was a reduction in the number of “plex” units—2-, 3- and 4plexes principally for the reasons that as a class those structures are the
oldest and thus more prone to being lost. 29

28

See Paul Emrath, MORE NEW HOMES NEEDED TO REPLACE OLDER STOCK (2018),
National Association of Home Builders. Retrieved March 23, 2020 from
https://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=263243.
29

AHS data show that while the median age of all housing units is 40 years that of plexes is 52
years. In contrast, the median age of detached homes is 42 years while townhomes are 36 years,
units in structures of 5-19 units is 38 years and unit in structures of more than 20 units is 40 years.
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Table 2
Housing Type Trends during 2010s
Metric

Overall Attached
Share
Share

2011

2017

Change

114,833

121,600

6,767

Single Family Detached

73,866

76,830

2,964

44%

Attached Housing

33,953

37,926

3,973

59%

6,660

8,958

2,298

58%

Total Occupied Units

Townhouse
Plex units (2-4 units in
structure)
5 or more units in structure

8,973

8,363

(610)

-15%

18,320

20,605

2,285

58%

7,013

6,802

-211

Manufactured Home, Other

-3%

Totals may not sum due to rounding

Figures in thousands.
Source: American Housing Survey

There is something else going on: The share of new detached homes to all
new homes has been declining in recent decades, as shown in Figure 4. From the
1920s into the 1950s, detached homes increased from 57 percent to 77 percent of
the share of all new occupied dwellings, falling steadily back to 57 percent in the
1980s. Housing finance innovations in the 1990s and 2000s led in part to an excess
supply of new detached homes into the 2000s but in the 2010s, the new detached
home share fell to 56 percent or below the level seen a century earlier. As the supply
of detached homes wanes, the supply of attached homes increases. These trends are
expected to continue for the foreseeable future, as I will show later.
As obvious as these trends seem, one can use the same data I do albeit
disingenuously to make a counter-factual point. Notably, much has been made in
the popular media about the ever increasing size of new single family dwelling that
has grown from about 1,500 square feet to more than 2,500 square feet from the
middle 1970s into the 2010s. This is seen as a good thing by Mark J. Perry of the
American Enterprise Institute:30

30

See New U.S. homes today are 1,000 square feet larger than in 1973 and living space per person
has nearly doubled from the American Enterprise Institute retrieved October 19, 2019 from
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We hear all the time about stagnating wages and household
incomes, the decline/demise/disappearance of the middle class,
rising income inequality, and lots of other narratives of gloom and
doom for the average American. But when it comes to the new
houses that Americans are buying and living in, we see a much
brighter picture of life in the US. The new houses that today’s
generation of homeowners are buying are larger by 1,000 square
feet compared to the average new houses our parents or
grandparents might have purchased in the 1970s, and have almost
twice the living space per person compared to the new houses built
42 years ago.
Let us examine the data in Table 3. While 94 percent of all new homes built
in the 1970s were less than 3,000 square feet, only 27 percent of new homes built
into the 2010s were. Indeed, there were nearly as many homes over 3,000 square
feet built annually in the 1970s as there were into the 2010s—about 100,000. But
in the 1970s they accounted for just six percent of the total share. Put differently,
there were (a) 3.1 times more homes built in the 1970s under 1,000 square feet than
into the 2010s, (b) 7.0 times more homes built between 1,000 and 2,000 square feet,
and (c) 3.6 times more homes built between 2,000 and 3,000 square feet. The
bottom line is that as fewer people were able to buy new homes in the 2010s than
in the 1970s, those who could bought larger ones. This is an indicator of growing
income and wealth inequality in America.31
Will there be a market for all these large new homes a few decades from
now? I address this question in Part 3. For now, I address Professor Myers’
rhetorical question relating to how America’s housing market will be reshaped by
predictable demographic changes.

https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/new-us-homes-today-are-1000-square-feet-larger-than-in-1973and-living-space-per-person-has-nearly-doubled/
31

See WHAT WEALTH INEQUALITY IN AMERICA LOOKS LIKE: KEY FACTS &
FIGURES from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, retrieved October 19, 2019 from
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/august/wealth-inequality-in-america-facts-figures.
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80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
1920s

1930s

1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

Figure 4
New detached dwelling share of all new dwellings by decade
Source: American Housing Survey

Table 3
Distribution of Detached Homes by Size, 1970s and 2010s
House Size

1970-1979

Share

2016-2017

Share

Ratio 1970s
to 2010s

Under 1,000

188

27%

61

16%

3.1

1,000 to 2,000

867

47%

123

33%

7.0

2,000 to 3,000

330

20%

92

24%

3.6

99

6%

101

27%

1.0

3,000 or more
Total units

1,483

376

Median Size

1,500

2,500

Figures in thousands.
Source: American Housing Survey for units; Census for median new house size,
rounded.
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Glacial Demographic Changes That Will Carve out New Housing Markets
There are two things that are certain about demographic changes. First, they
come slowly—year to year changes are nearly imperceptible. Second, over time,
like a glacier, they will reshape everything.
Using data from the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), 32 the
nature of changes that are coming are reported in three tables. Table 4 presents
broad changes in the distribution of households by householder age between 2018
and 2038.33 Three householder age categories are used: under 35 years of age;
between 35 and 64 years of age; and more than 64 years of age (being 65 years old
or older). Table 4 shows three important trends.
First, starter home households—those with householders under 35 years of
age—will account for less than one percent of the increase in total households.
Inasmuch as apartment and other forms of rental housing are driven by the
formation of starter home households, this segment of market demand may soften
into the last 2030s.
Second, accounting for about 20 percent, the growth in peak housing
demand households—those with householders between 35 and 64 years of age—
will be the lowest it has been at any time in America’s history. Inasmuch as larger
homes on larger lots dominated America’s housing construction from the end of
World War II to about 2010, these numbers suggest a sea-change looms favoring
housing that is other than larger homes on larger lots.
Third, downsizing households—those with households more than 64 years
old—will account for 80 percent of the change in households.
But there is more. Consider multi-adult households with two or more
persons more than 18 years of age. These can be newly formed households before
child-rearing as well as empty-nesting and downsizing households. Table 5 shows
that 93 percent of the change in these households from 2018 to 2038 will be of
downsizing age. Put differently, whereas growth in pre-child, multi-adult
householders under 35 years of age is strong predictor of future demand for larger
homes on larger lots, we see from Table 5 that there will be no growth in those
households through the 2030s.

32

Id., TENURE PROJECTIONS in passim.

33

As a reminder to the reader, in Table 1, I extrapolated TENURE PROJECTION figures from
2038 to 2040 meaning figures in subsequent tables are not directly comparable.
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The trend among single-person households is more dramatic. Table 6 shows
that virtually all the growth among those households will be among downsizing
householders (those 64 years and older) mostly as partners separate or pass on.

Table 4
Distribution of Change in Households by Householder Age, 2018-2038
Householders (HHers)

2018

2038

Change

Share

HHers < 35 (starter HHs)

26,499

26,695

197

<1 %

HHers 35-64 (peak housing HHs

68,439

72,695

4,255

20%

HHers > 64 (downsizing HHs)

32,869

50,156

17,286

80%

127,807

149,546

21,739

Total

Figures in thousands.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Harvard JCHS (2019) projections 2018-2038.

Table 5
Distribution of Change in Multi-Adult Households by Householder Age,
2018-2038
Multi-Adult Households
(HHs)

2018

2038

Change

Share

HHs < 35 (starter HHs)

10,089

10,113

25

0%

HHs 35-64 (peak housing HHs)

29,467

30,091

624

7%

HHs > 64 (downsizing HHs)

18,554

27,069

8,514

93%

Total

58,110

67,273

9,163

Figures in thousands.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Harvard JCHS (2019) projections 2018-2038.

Table 6

Published by Reading Room, 2020

491

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 28

Distribution of Change in Single Person Households by Householder Age,
2018-2038
Single Person Households
(HHs)
HHs < 35 (starter HHs)

2018

2038

Change

Share

5,849

5,697

-152

-2%

HHs 35-64 (peak housing HHs)

15,007

15,153

146

2%

HHs > 64 (downsizing HHs)

13,884

22,402

8,518

100%

Total

34,739

43,252

8,512

Figures in thousands.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Harvard JCHS (2019) projections 2018-2038.

What does this mean for home ownership into the late 2030s? The Harvard
JCHS includes projections of tenure (owner or renter) from 2018 to 2038 for three
scenarios:34


The “base” scenario, which holds homeownership rates constant at
their 2018 where the homeownership rate changes little from 64.3
percent in 2018 to 64.1 percent.



The “high” scenario where homeownership rates bounded to their
longer-term, mostly pre-Great Recession (2007-2009) averages
where homeownership grows to 65.6 percent in 2038.



The “low” scenario where the homeownership rate falls to 62.6
percent in 2038.

I choose the low scenario for several reasons. One is insights gained from
the Urban Institute’s projections of homeownership rates to 2030 show a range of
62.0 percent to 62.2 percent, 35 both lower than the 2020 homeownership rate of
about 64.0 percent.36 Their projections recognize that (a) nearly all household
34

Id., TENURE PROJECTIONS at unpaginated 3.

35

Id., HEADSHIP AND HOMEOWNERSHIP.

36

See data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHORUSQ156N.
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growth in the U.S. going forward will be other than White non-Hispanic and (b)
homeownership rates of Hispanic (all races) and Black (only) households has been
relatively constant even through the 2000s when the national ownership rate
reached historic highs. Moreover, using three very different techniques, three
studies published by HUD showed that because of demographic shifts, the
homeownership rate in 2050 is projected to fall to about 54 percent. 37 Indeed, the
“low” scenario of the Harvard JCHS is higher than all four of these other studies
which makes its numbers less dramatic than those projections. 38
There are two other reasons. A key one is that millennials may be sitting on
the sidelines and deferring home buying39 because they: (a) witnessed first-hand
the trauma of family and friends facing foreclosure, short-sale, bankruptcy and
related effects of the Great Recession;40 (b) have high student debt that is the
highest ever41 largely because states have cut subsidies for public college education
by up to half or more in real dollar terms; 42 and (c) are concerned about economic
insecurity making renting a more rational option than buying. 43

37

Those studies are: Arthur C. Nelson, On the Plausibility of a 53-Percent Homeownership Rate
by 2050, JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 18(1) 125-129 (2016);
Dowell Myers and Hyojung Lee, Cohort Momentum and Future Homeownership: The Outlook to
2050, CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 18(1) 131143 (2016); and Arthur Acolin, Laurie S. Goodman, Susan M. Wachter, A Renter or Homeowner
Nation? CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 18(1)
145-157 (2016).
38

Mathematically, using the Harvard JCHS low scenario, extrapolation of the ownership change
from 2018 to 2038 forward to 2050 results in a 62 percent homeownership rare in 2050,
considerably higher than the referenced studies.
39

For background trends, see National Association of Realtors, HOME BUYER AND SELLER
GENERATIONAL TRENDS (2020). Though millennials are buying homes in larger numbers
than in the past, the share of millennials owning homes is substantially lower than same age of
prior generations.
40

Still-wounded millennials share horror stories from the 2008 financial crisis, MARKET
WATCH (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heartbreak-and-panic-attacksmillennials-still-deeply-wounded-from-2008-financial-crisis-2018-09-26.
41

Scott Berridge, Millennials after the Great Recession, MONTHY LABOR REVUEW
(September 20104); see also HOME BUYER AND SELLER GENERATIONAL TRENDS.
42

Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman, Kathleen Masterson, and Samantha Waxman, UNKEPT
PROMISES: STATE CUTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION THREATEN ACCESS AND EQUITY
(October 2018).
43

For an interesting discourse, see Why don't more millennials buy homes? QUORA (2017),
https://www.quora.com/Why-dont-more-millennials-buy-homes
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The other is the Tax Cut and Jobs Act that reduces the desirability of
homeownership generally by: (a) capping mortgage interest and property tax
deductions from taxable income; (b) removing home refinancing loan interest
deductibility from taxable income—one consequence being compromising the
ability of parents to support their children’s college education; and (c) requiring
workers to pay taxes on moving expenses paid by employers thereby reducing cash
they need to buy a home in a new location if not have the worker decline the
relocation opportunity. 44
Given the weight of the evidence, the Harvard JCHS homeownership low
scenario is used with results reported in Table 7. These trends are not favorable to
sustaining homeownership rates over time. Consider:


Though increasing by just 200,000 households, there will be a net
decrease in starter homeowner householders (householders under 35
years of age) of more than one-half million homes as nearly three
quarters of a million of them choose to rent.



Nearly all the change in the number of peak space demand households
(householders between 35 and 64 years of age) will be renters.



About 72 percent of the change in downsizing households
(householders more than 64 years of age) will be homeowners but that
is mostly because they already owned a home before reaching the
householder age category.



All of the net change in the number of householders who are under 65
years of age will be attributed to renting.

Here is the problem: Mathematically, with 13 million more senior home
owners between 2018 and 2038 than all other households combined, there are
not enough younger or “upsizing” households to acquire homes of aging or
“downsizing” households even if millions of seniors are able to age in place. And
it gets worse as will be shown.

44

For a review, see William G. Gale, Hilary Gelfond, Aaron Krupkin, Mark J. Mazur, and Eric
Toder, EFFECTS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
(2018).
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Table 7
Distribution of Low Scenario Tenure Change by Householder Age, 2018-2038
Householder Age and
Tenure
All Householders

2018

2038

Change

Share

127,807

149,546

21,739

Owner

82,210

93,662

11,452

53%

Renter

45,597

55,883

10,286

47%

Ownership Rate

64.3%

62.6%

26,499

26,695

196

Owner

9,25

8,713

(543)

-277%

Renter

17,243

17,983

740

377%

Householders <35

Ownership Rate

34.9%

32.6%

68,439

72,695

4,256

Owner

47,042

46,813

(229)

-5%

Renter

21,397

25,882

4,485

105%

Householders 35-64

Ownership Rate

68.7%

64.4%

32,869

50,156

17,287

Owner

25,912

38,438

12,526

72%

Renter

6,958

11,718

4,760

28%

Householders >64

Ownership Rate

78.8%

76.6%

Householders < 65

94,938

99,390

4,452

Owner

56,298

55,526

(772)

-17%

Renter

38,640

43,864

5,224

117%

Ownership Rate

59.3%

55.9%

Change in senior home owners to all others

13,298

Figures in thousands.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Harvard JCHS (2019) projections 2018-2038.
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Nature of Current Supply
In this section, I review the nature of the current supply of housing with
special reference to housing occupied by households based on householder age and
type. The next and last section of this Part will show the rise in the demand for
homes in walkable communities. (Part 2 will show the mismatch between the
current supply housing and the future demand for walkable communities.)
Table 8 shows the distribution of occupied housing units by householder
age and type for 2017, the most recent year data were available for this study. 45 Of
all occupied units, 69 percent were detached single family (including manufactured
homes) while 31 percent were various forms of attached housing such as
townhomes, apartments, condominiums, cooperatives and others. As one may
expect, the propensity for a householder to occupy a detached unit increases with
age that is until householders are more than 64 years of age, where the propensity
to occupy an attached unit increases.
The bottom part of Table 8 shows the distribution of households by type
with respect to occupied detached and attached units. Not surprisingly, households
with children occupied detached units at a much higher rate than households
without children but there is a nuance. Subtracting single person households whose
occupancy of detached and attached units is about equal, multi-adult households
without children occupied detached units at the highest rate. I surmise that they
include millions of households who are empty nesters after their boomer and Gen
X children left home.
Table 8 is the baseline supply against which future demand is compared.
The next section addresses the nature of changing demand for housing in walkable
communities.

45

See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES, 2017 (2018).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/28

496

Nelson: The Great Senior Short-Sale

Table 8
Distribution of Occupied Housing Units by Householder Age and Type, 2017
Metric
Householder (HHer)
Age

All Units

Detached
Units

Attached
Units

Detached
Attached
Units Share Units Share

114,514

79,289

35,225

69%

31%

HHer <35

20,613

9,515

11,098

46%

54%

HHer 35-49

28,629

19,822

8,806

69%

31%

HHer 50-64

34,354

26,165

8,189

76%

24%

HHer >64

30,919

22,994

7,925

74%

26%

Household (HH) Type

114,514

79,289

35,225

69%

31%

HHs with Children

36,644

26,958

9,686

74%

26%

HHs w/o Children

77,870

52,331

25,539

67%

33%

1-Person HHs

30,919

15,858

15,061

51%

49%

Multi-Adult HHs

46,951

36,473

10,478

78%

22%

Figures in thousands.
Multi-adult HHs means those without children.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: American Housing Survey for 2017.
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Nature of Emerging Preference for Homes in Walkable Communities
America’s housing market is being driven by an increasing preference for
living in walkable communities with mixed uses.46 I use the word “preference”
instead of “demand” because demand implies what people want in the absence of
choices while preferences are based on what people prefer when given reasonably
plausible choices.
What is a walkable community? After all, most people probably live where
they can walk to something if just for leisure. A walkable community is one where
a person can walk or bicycle safely to such destinations as shopping, restaurants,
services, school, and work within about 10 to 15 minutes.47 While there is no metric
that tracks walkable communities nationally or the change in the number of people
living in those communities over time, some insights are available from the
American Housing Survey for 2013. Table 8 shows the overall weighted average
share of households living in homes that are walkable to grocery stores, personal
services, retail shopping, entertainment, health care services and personal banking
is 22 percent.48 The share among householders by household age ranges from a
high of 29 percent among those under 35 years of age to 20 percent among those
between 35 and 64 years of age, to a low of 13 percent among those age 65 years
and over. Also shown in Table 8 and not surprising is that the youngest householder
category has the lowest share of households living in detached homes—45
percent—compared to 70 percent or more of the households in the older age
categories.
To understand Americans’ preference for living in walkable communities,
I turn to the National Association of Realtors’ (NAR) Community Preference
Survey. It was conducted first in 2004 and then every odd numbered year since
2011.49 Among the first questions asked by the NAR is the kind of home in which
46

See Dan Parolek with Arthur C. Nelson, MISSING MIDDLE HOUSING (2020).

47

See Christopher B. Leinberger and Patrick Lynch, FOOT TRAFFIC AHEAD: RANKING
WALKABLE URBANISM IN AMERICA’S LARGEST METROS (2014).
48

Unfortunately, the survey does not specify restaurants which could be subsumed within
entertainment or retail shopping. The survey also included a category for schools and work but
without separating them.
49

This is a stated preference survey meaning that respondents are forced to choose between
roughly equally attractive options. Other housing related studies are simply preferences: Would
you prefer marble or Formica counter tops? The difference between preference and statedpreference surveys is this: A preference survey would ask if you prefer to live to be 80 or 100
while a stated preference survey would have you choose now between being healthy and active
until 80 when you keel over and die suddenly without pain or live to 100 after 20 years of
dementia and incontinence.
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a respondent would choose to live with choices being a single-family detached
home, townhome, apartment, condominium or other. More than 70 percent of
respondents choose the single-family detached home. The survey then confronts
respondents with reasonably plausible choices in two sets of questions.
Respondents choose between (a) small detached lots 50 in walkable communities or
conventional lots that are auto-dependent and (b) attached homes (such as
townhouses, condominiums and apartments) in walkable communities or
conventional auto-dependent ones. Those stated preference questions are reported
in Figure 5.
However, this tells us only two things. First, it tells us only the kind of
detached home a respondent would choose between large lot drive-only and small
lot walkable options. Second, it tells us only which option the respondent would
choose between attached walkable and detached drivable choices. We do not know
how respondents are distributed by household type and householder age with
respect to preferences for large lot drivable only homes, small lot homes in
walkable communities, or attached homes also in attached communities. I reanalyze the NAR’s raw survey data to do so. Key distributions are reported in
Tables 9 and 10 in several ways. One is for the distribution of preference for large
lot drive-only, small lot walkable, and attached walkable communities. I will use
these distributions to estimate the preference for walkable communities later.
Another is for purely detached homes. The last distribution is for purely homes in
walkable communities. These distributions are interpreted as follows:


The percentages in the rows of the first three numerical columns sum
to 100 percent (or close because of rounding);



The fourth numerical column shows the percent of households
preferring a detached home (the sum of the first and third numerical
columns) over an attached home regardless of walkability; and



The last column shows the percent of households preferring to live in a
walkable community regardless of the kind of home (the sum of the
second and third numerical columns).

50

Though surveys often ask respondents to choose between small and large or conventional lots,
respondents are not given parameters leaving them to define the terms in their local context. A
“small lot” in Atlanta on one-quarter acre can be viewed as a large lot in Los Angeles.
Nonetheless, in most contexts outside New York City, Los Angeles, and the Bay Area, small lot
can be characterized as being one-eighth of an acre or less which is the smallest lot category
published by the AHS.
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This analysis is important because it will show that the emerging preference
for homes is working against the current supply of larger homes on larger lots.
Using a special set of questions included in the 2013 version of the
American Housing Survey, I was able to compare the existing supply of walkable
communities by householder age to demand based on the NAR survey. Results
are reported in Table 9. The bottom line is whereas about 72 percent of
households want to live in a walkable community only 22 percent do.

Table 9
Share of Households by Householder Age Who Live in Walkable Communities
Householder Age

Walkable Community Walkable Community
Supply
Demand

< 35 Years of Age

29%

73%

35 to 64 Years of Age

20%

67%

> 64 Years of Age

13%

74%

All

22%

72%

Source: American Housing Survey for 2013 for supply and NAR (2017) for
demand.
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Figure 5
NAR Community Preference Survey stated preference questions relating to
choosing between home types and walkable versus drivable communities
Source: National Association of Realtors.
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Table 10
Distribution of Community Preferences by Type of Home based on
Demographic Characteristics
Large Lot
Home
Small Lot
Attached
Household (HH)
Drive
Home
Home
Detached
Type by Age and
Only to Walkable to Walkable to
Home
Householder Age
Places
Places
Places
Preference
HHs with Children
Under 35 years
Between 35-64
years
65 Years and
Older
Multi-Adult HHs
w/o Children
Under 35 years
Between 35-64
years
65 Years and
Older
Single Person
HHs
Under 35 years
Between 35-64
years
65 Years and
Older
All Households
Under 35 years
Between 35-64
years
65 Years and
Older

42%

28%

29%

71%

Walkable
Home
Preference
58%

40%

22%

37%

63%

60%

43%

31%

27%

73%

57%

43%

33%

23%

77%

57%

37%

28%

35%

65%

63%

37%

25%

39%

61%

63%

36%

31%

33%

67%

64%

41%

26%

33%

67%

59%

24%

37%

38%

62%

76%

24%

37%

39%

61%

76%

24%

39%

37%

63%

76%

22%

30%

39%

36%

38%

35%

62%

65%

78%

70%

27%

34%

39%

61%

73%

33%

35%

32%

68%

67%

26%

41%

33%

67%

74%

Units in thousands of units.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from National Association of Realtors (2017).
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Not surprisingly, the largest preference shares are for any kind of detached
home, whether drive-only or walkable to places, ranging from 62 percent for single
person households to 71 percent for households with children. But, with one
exception, people prefer to live in walkable communities by larger shares. Among
all households, the walkable preference is 70 percent reaching a high of 76 percent
for single person households though falling to 63 percent for multi-adult
households without children. The exception is households with children where
most (58 percent) still prefer to live in walkable communities.
From the perspective of households with householders 65 or more years of
age, only 26 percent prefer large lot homes in drive only communities while 74
percent prefer to live in walkable communities. Indeed, among all age groups,
senior households prefer detached homes in drive only communities the least of all
age groups yet that is exactly where most of them live.
Table 11 uses the distributions in Table 10 to project preferences for the
kind of homes for the same household types and age groups. In 2038, more than
105 million of America’s nearly 150 million households, or 70 percent, would
prefer to live in walkable communities. Yet only about a fifth of households lived
in walkable communities in the 2010s.51
Mathematically, even if all new housing units built from this Festschrift to
2038 were in walkable communities—increasing from about 28 million to 63
million, a little more than half the preference for homes in walkable communities
would be met. More impressive is that of the 50 million senior households in 2038,
74 percent or 37 million of them prefer to live in a walkable community. Yet, they
are the ones who dominate non-walkable suburbia.
There will soon be too many sellers for too few buyers across large swaths
of America, as will be shown in Part 2.

51

See Id., MISSING MIDDLE HOUSING.
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Table 11
Preferred Housing Units by Type of Home based on Demographic Characteristics, 2018
Household (HH) Type by
Householder Age

Projected
2038

Small Lot Home
Large Lot Home Not
Walkable to Places Walkable to Places

39,021

HHs with Children

16,387

11,092

Attached Home
Walkable to Places
11,542

Under 35 years

10,885

4,398

2,419

4,068

Between 35-64 years

27,450

11,686

8,426

7,338

65 Years and Older

685

298

228

159

Multi-Adult HHs w/o Children

67,273

25,644

18,863

22,766

Under 35 years

10,113

3,705

2,504

3,905

Between 35-64 years

30,091

10,833

9,328

9,930

65 Years and Older

27,069

11,098

7,038

8,932

43,252

Single Person HHs

9,979

16,845

16,428

Under 35 years

5,697

1,367

2,108

2,222

Between 35-64 years

15,153

3,636

5,910

5,607

65 Years and Older

22,402

4,978

8,825

8,599

149,546

All Households

44,216

55,121

50,209

Under 35 years

26,695

7,208

9,076

10,411

Between 35-64 years

72,695

23,989

25,443

23,262

65 Years and Older

50,156

13,041

20,564

16,551

Units in thousands of units.
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Adapted from Spader (2019).
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Part 2: Too Many Senior Homes for Too Few Younger Buyers
In normal times, younger generations replace older generations’ homes.
Those times may be over for four reasons: (1) the sheer number of boomers who
may be selling their homes is simply larger than the number of those who may want
to buy them; (2) seniors may choose to live in their homes many years or decades
longer than seen historically as they “age in place”; (3) millennials may be on the
sidelines and not interested in buying boomers’ homes anyway; and (4) there is a
large geographic mismatch between where seniors who want to sell their homes are
and younger generations who would normally be expected to buy those homes are
located. All this adds up to perhaps more than 10 million seniors being unable to
sell their homes between this Festschrift and about 2040.
Sheer Number of Senior Sellers Dwarfs the Supply of Younger Buyers
Here I will restate numbers presented above differently to make a point.
Between 2018 and 2038, seniors will account for 80 percent of the net change in
total households while younger generations will account for just 20 percent. There
are two dynamics at work. For one thing, seniors are mostly boomers who, as of
this Festschrift, still accounts for the largest share of America’s generations. 52 As
they age, the average household size of boomers gets smaller because partners
separate or pass on with the overall effect that the demand for boomer housing
actually increases compared to that of Millennials who are partnering and having
children. The other dynamic is that seniors are not actually adding to the population
because they are already here and just simply aging into another age category.
Now consider a thought experiment. What if all seniors disappeared
overnight. Who is left to buy their homes? And will buyers even want those homes
considering their features and that they are mostly in non-walkable communities?
The U.S. is still growing of course but there will come a time when seniors exit
their homes in very large numbers about the same time either by moving someplace
else or passing on. When they do, there may be a glut in the range of 15 million to

52

This claim depends on when one considers the years in which Millennials were born. I use 1981
through 1996—indeed I prefer to call them Gen-Y since none were actually born in the 21 st
century. See https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-andgeneration-z-begins/. Others consider Millennials to have been born between 1980 and 1999—
adding four more years to that generation. Under this scenario, Millennials outnumbered boomers
at the time of this Festschrift. See https://money.cnn.com/interactive/economy/diversitymillennials-boomers/.
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18 million homes until younger generations increase in numbers sufficiently to
offset senior exits.53
The silver lining of the looming glut of housing is that prices will be driven
down and homeownership will be made more affordable (or less unaffordable) for
those who are in the market. On the other hand, the looming glut may trigger the
next recession.54, 55
The Misguided Romanticism of Aging in Place
One solution to the dampening the prospect of seniors glutting the market
with homes to sell is to find ways for seniors to stay in their homes longer—aging
in place. The idea is that if enough seniors age in place long enough, fewer senior
homes will be on the market at any given point thereby giving younger generations
more time to acquire the means to acquire them. 56 That strategy may be limited to
those millions of seniors able to age in place or who live in areas where markets are
robust enough to absorb senior sales, but not millions more.
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) estimates that nearly
80 percent of Americans over 50 years of age want to “age in place” meaning, at
the extreme, that they want to live in their homes until they are carried out dead. 57
This romanticism is advocated by the AARP and advanced through various policies

53

In THE COMING EXODUS OF OLDER HOMEOWNERS (2018) Dowell Myers and Patrick
Simmons estimate that about 35 million boomers will exit their homes between 2016 and 2036 yet
data provided by the Harvard JCHS indicates that total new, younger households will grow by
fewer than 20 million (see
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/household_growth_projections2016_jchs.pdf and
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eGsLWXaZY8sJ:https://www.jchs.harv
ard.edu/research-areas/working-papers/updated-household-growth-projections-2018-2028-and2028-2038+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) leaving a deficit in the range of 15 million housing
units and as will be seen later perhaps as high at 18 million homes.
54

See Annie Lowrey, THE NEXT RECESSION WILL DESTROY MILLENNIALS (2019).

55

As this issue of the Journal of Urban Law and Policy went to press, COVID-19 had put more
than 30 million American workers out of work, about 20 percent of the total workforce. The
Federal Reserve Board warns that unemployment may not return to pre-COVID-19 levels for
many years.
56

Dowell Myers, IMMIGRANTS AND BOOMERS: FORGING A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
FOR THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2007).
57

See https://www.aarp.org/research/topics/community/info-2018/2018-home-communitypreference.html.
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aimed at supporting seniors in their homes58 in my view perhaps longer than may
be reasonable.59 I hypothesize that there are two kinds of seniors who age in place:
those who age-in-place voluntarily and those who age-in-place involuntarily.
Those who age-in-place voluntarily would seem to be in good health, have
the financial means to maintain their property, enjoy mobility, and have important
social networks.60 The AARP offers numerous guides for this population. 61 Key
issues arise when seniors lose mobility, cannot maintain their home or property,
and need in-home or even live-in care. With federal, state, regional and local tax
support, transportation agencies provide some mobility options 62 while public
agencies, private providers and nonprofits arrange in-home care including
companionship63 and a range of providers offer home and yard maintenance and
repair.64
While many millions of seniors wish to and can age in place voluntarily
other millions will age in place involuntarily and not in their best interest. 65 For
58

For a review of the suite of such policies, many of which are state, regional and local policies,
see https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/aging-place-growing-older-home. See especially AARPs’ 2018
HOME AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCES SURVEY (2018).
59

See the Annotated Questionnaire for AARPs’ 2018 HOME AND COMMUNITY
PREFERENCES SURVEY (2018) found at
https://www.aarp.org/research/topics/community/info-2018/2018-home-communitypreference.html. The Annotated Questionnaire reveals that the survey itself is seriously flawed in
that it does not ask people older than 50 about their preferences for aging in place. For instance
people in their 50s and 60s are usually healthy and do not see the need to relocate. But when they
become empty nesters and older, and lack mobility options and are in declining heath, I
hypothesize that large shares of such households want relocation options. The survey is not
designed to explore relocation preferences of such seniors.
60

For a review of how one may age in place generally and especially absent good health,
immobility, and weak social networks, see Aaron D. Murphy, AGING IN PLACE (2014). See
also https://www.agingwisely.com/pros-and-cons-of-aging-in-place/
61

See the AARP’s THE CENTER FOR AGING IN PLACE WEBSITE at
https://www.aarp.org/livable-communities/learn/civic-community/info-12-2012/the-center-foraging-in-place-website.html.
62

See a review of options at https://www.agingcare.com/articles/finding-transportation-servicesfor-seniors-104572.htm. See also HUD PROGRAMS SUPPORT AGING IN PLACE,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/fall13/highlight1_sidebar.html.
63

For a review of a sample of private providers and services, see
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/health/in-home-care/#.
64

For a review of services and providers, see https://www.aginginplace.org/10-resources-forliving-independently-as-a-senior/.
65

For a review, see https://www.seniorliving.com/article/nine-reasons-aging-place-may-not-beright-you, https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2015/03/23/do-you-really-want-to-age-in-
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those millions, there simply are no affordable options other than staying in a home
that does not meet their needs.66 For one thing, other than aging in place
involuntarily, there are few options for seniors to relocate to more appropriate
housing because land use regulations prevent creating those options. 67 Another is
that home owner associations regulate the size, tenure, and renovations of homes
in ways that may prevent seniors from adjusting their homes to allow them to do
so.68
Eventually, however, seniors will leave their homes. The question is: who
will buy them?
Millennials on the Sidelines
To say that the Great Recession of 2007-2009 affected America’s housing
market may be an understatement.69 Among the casualties are Millennials who not
only faced bleak job opportunities early in their careers but their incomes lagged. 70
At least one commentator worries that being in debt, without savings, and incomes

place/#4e345fd98ec4, https://www.agingcare.com/articles/is-aging-in-place-always-the-bestoption-for-seniors-185858.htm, and Stephen M. Golant, AGING IN THE RIGHT PLACE (2015).
66

The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) offers many ways in which seniors’
homes can be retrofitted to meet their needs (see https://www.aarp.org/livablecommunities/housing/info-2016/aging-friendly-renovation-improvements.html). Retrofitting can
be expensive, however, and often requires building permits, contracting, and inspections not to
mention unforeseen costs or even discovering that modern building codes may prevent it.
67
For a succinct review of local land use controls as impediments to expanding the choices for
downsizing senior households, and households generally, see Sanford Ikeda and Emily
Washington, HOW LAND-USE REGULATION UNDERMINES AFFORDABLE HOUSING
(2015).
68

The literature on the exclusive nature of home owner associations is extensive. See Wyatt
Clarke and Matthew Freedman, THE RISE AND EFFECTS OF HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS (2019) for a current review and assessment.
69

See Arthur C. Nelson, John Travis Marshall, Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer and James C.
Nicholas, MARKET DEMAND BASED PLANNING AND PERMITTING (2017) for a review
of the causes and consequences of permitting more development than the market can absorb, often
leading to recessions including the Great Recession, as well as their planning and permitting
proposals to prevent future real estate related recessions.
70

See Tami Luhby, MILLENNIALS BORN IN 1980S MAY NEVER RECOVER FROM THE
GREAT RECESSION (2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/22/news/economy/1980smillennials-great-recession-study/index.html.
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still stunted from the Great Recession, "The Next Recession Will Destroy
Millennials”.71 The COVI-19 drive recession of the early 2020s comes to mind. 72
Even for those who want to buy homes, mortgage underwriting after the
Great Recession made it more difficult to buy homes.73 Moreover, as of 2016,
students loans were required to be factored into mortgage underwriting whereas
before they were excluded.74 It is as though, whereas the home buying system was
rigged FOR boomers and Gen Xers, it is now rigged AGAINST Millennials and
likely Gen Zers. One consequence is that at the time of this Festschrift, Millennial
home ownership remained about 10 points below similarly aged cohorts. 75
Millennials may also have different attitudes toward buying homes than
older generations. Paraphrasing the Urban Institute’s findings about Millennial 76
homeownership, they include preference for living in more urban (and higher cost)
areas, deferred marriage and child rearing, economic uncertainty associated with
the trauma of the Great Recession—including distrusting home ownership as a wise
investment. To this I would add my experience as a college professor since the
1980s where Millennials and Gen Zers want to be settled in their life including
employment, geographic location and family before buying a home.
Mismatch between Supply and Demand by Housing Type
There is another problem: The growing mismatch between the type of
housing the market appears to prefer in 2038 compared to the supply in 2017 (the
most recent year for which data are available).
Part 1 estimated the demand for housing between attached, small and large
lot types based on their walkability. Here, I focus on the 2038 preference for generic
types of housing compared to the 2017 supply. Table 12 shows the distribution of
occupied homes by attached (including townhomes), small lot (those under onesixth of an acre but excluding townhomes), and large lot being all other detached
71

Annie Lowrey, The Next Recession Will Destroy Millennials, ATLANTIC (2019).

72

A recession, related to the COVID-19 pandemic, was declared officially on June 5, 2020, by the
National Bureau of Economic Research. See https://www.nber.org/cycles/june2020.html.
73

See Robert M. Couch, THE GREAT RECESSION’S MOST UNFORTUNATE VICTIM:
HOMEOWNERSHIP (2013).
74

See HUD, MORTGAGEE LETTER 2016-08.

75

Census, Census, HOMEOWNERSHIP REMAINS BELOW 2006 LEVELS FOR ALL AGE
GROUPS (2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/homeownership-by-age.html.
76

Jung Choi, Jun Zhu, Laurie Goodman and Bhargavi Ganesh, MILLENNIAL
HOMEOWNERSHIP WHY IS IT SO LOW, AND HOW CAN WE INCREASE IT? (2018)
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homes.77 For 2017, I estimate there were about 30 million attached homes, 29
million small lot homes, and 63 million large lot homes. From Table 11, we know
the 2038 preference based on the NAR’s community preference survey will be for
52 million, 54 million, and 45 million occupied homes, respectively. In other words,
between 2017 and 2038 there will need to be:




23 million more attached homes and
25 million more small lot homes but
18 million fewer large lot homes.

This trend is illustrated in Figure 12.
Inasmuch as it seems unlikely that about one million large lot homes per
year will somehow be converted into small lot or attached homes, there will likely
be millions more homes on large lots in 2038 than the market would seem to need.
While I will show in Part 3 that some of the projected excess supply may indeed be
converted especially into “plexes,” the magnitude of the excess supply is unlikely
to be overcome. It is not that the market was unresponsive to pressing needs in the
past—indeed it was quite responsive in meeting the demand for larger homes on
larger lots to meet the needs of boomer and Gen X households. Between 1980 and
2010, that demand was met through the construction of about 28 million homes of
which I estimate about 20 million were built on large lots. The problem is that those
same boomer and Gen X households are downsizing resulting in an excess supply
of large lot homes in 2038 that will be hard to overcome because of their location,
configuration, and sheer volume.78

77

For details on how the types are defined, see Arthur C. Nelson, Leadership in a New Era,
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (2006).
78

See Arthur C. Nelson, RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2013).
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Table 12
Housing Supply 2017, Preference 2038 and Absorption 2017-38 for Occupied
Attached, Small Lot and Large Lot Homes
House Type

Supply 2017

Demand 2038

Absorption

Attached

29,726

52,341

22,615

Small Lot

28,921

53,837

24,916

62,913

44,864

(18,049)

121,560

149,546

27,986

Large Lot
Total

Source: Data for 2017 adapted from American Housing Survey. Data for 2038
from Table 11.

70
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Figure 6
Housing supply 2017 from AHS, demand 2038 from NAR and change,
“absorption” 2017-38 for occupied attached, small lot and large lot homes
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Geographic Mismatch
Not all areas will be impacted the same during the Great Senior Short Sale.
Many thriving areas will benefit from the ready supply of homes to meet the needs
of younger generations even if modifications are needed (see Part 3). Others will
be adversely affected. Still others may be devastated.
Figure 7 illustrates the counties where population is projected to decline
from this Festschrift through the 2030s, or the growth in the number of those
becoming seniors will be equivalent to 75 percent or more of the counties’ growth.
In all, more than half of the counties in the contiguous states are at risk. Ongoing
research will estimate the number of seniors for whom there may be insufficient
buyers of their homes but preliminary analysis shows it is about half of the 15
million to 18 million shortfall of younger generation buyers to seniors exiting their
homes noted earlier. The other half may be in counties not designated by the census
as core based statistical areas (CBSAs),79 and exurban and suburban fringe areas
for which long term housing market demand is weak.80
Should we really worry about millions of seniors who seem certain to be
trapped in homes they cannot sell, or in millions of cases be unable to rent their
homes to others? After all, if there is no market for their homes, why intervene to
bail them out of decisions they made years or decades ago? But if intervention is
chosen, what are some of the options?

79

See https://www.census.gov/topics/housing/housing-patterns/about/core-based-statisticalareas.html
80

See Arthur C. Nelson, RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2013).
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Figure 7
Counties at risk for senior short sale
Source: Data from Woods and Poole Economics. Graphic by Robert Hibberd.
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Part 3: Policy Inertia is not an Option
… the exit of Boomer homeowners will occur on such a massive scale that
it could alter the long-term demand-supply balance in ways that are
negative for the home sales market and home prices. Dowell Myers81
Without policy intervention, the great senior short sale is imminent. By the
end of the 2030s, the prospect of millions of seniors being unable to sell their homes
for what they hoped based on experience or even at all would seem likely to
dominate policy discussions. In the meantime, glacial demographic change will be
barely perceptible year over year—until it is too late. Proactive policies are needed
now, some of which may be unpopular. They include: (1) making aging in place
work where it makes sense; (2) right-sizing supply in strong markets; (3) rightsizing supply in weak markets; and (4) rethinking mortgage underwriting. While
doing nothing is an option, that assures that millions of America’s seniors are
essentially abandoned by their own country which really is not an option, in my
view.
Make Aging in Place Work
I expressed reservations about aging-in-place earlier. On the other hand, to
minimize the impending glut of housing it may be useful to keep seniors in their
homes for as long as possible. This is a double edged sword. One side of the blade
would advance policies and public investment to sustain seniors in their housing
but the other side means depriving younger households of the very housing they
may need to meet their housing needs.
One way to accommodate both needs is to use the existing housing stock
more efficiently. Joe Cortright of City Observatory observes the U.S. has 40 million
more bedrooms in its housing stock than people—the highest excess capacity
ever.82 As seen in Table 13, the figures for detached homes is even more
pronounced with the average home having 20 percent more bedrooms than people.
These bedrooms could be unleashed to help seniors age in place with households
who could share their home with others who can assume a range of property
management and caregiving services. 83
81

Id., THE COMING EXODUS OF OLDER HOMEOWNERS.

82

Joe Cortright, HOUSING: A SHORTAGE OF CITIES
http://cityobservatory.org/housing_cortright/.
83

See Gabriela Sandoval and Ricardo G. Huerta Niño, PROMOTING FAMILY ECONOMIC
SECURITY IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA REGION (2015).
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There are two impediments to unleashing this pent up supply: land use
regulations and home owner associations but both may be remedied through state
legislation. For instance, in 2019, Oregon adopted House Bill 2001 that eliminated
single family detached unit zoning by allowing up to four residential units on single
family lots in jurisdictions housing most of the state’s residents. 84 Because it is a
state law, it is possible that covenants, conditions and restrictions prohibiting
anything but single family homes would be inconsistent with state law and thus
unenforceable.85 Minneapolis adopted a similar citywide ordinance also in 2019.86
As of this writing several states are also exploring this option.
But there is more than can be done to help seniors through the pending glut
of homes, as will be outlined next.

Table 13
Empty Bedrooms and Bedrooms per Person, 2017
Metric

All Units

Detached

Attached

Units

114,514

79,289

35,225

People

286,776

212,935

73,841

2.5

2.7

2.1

323,536

256,603

66,933

36,760

43,668

(6,908)

1.1

1.2

0.9

Persons per Unit
Bedrooms
Empty Bedrooms
Bedrooms per Person

Figures may not sum due to rounding.
Source. American Housing Survey for 2017.

84

For a detailed examination of history of single family zoning and the politics behind Oregon’s
law, see Daniel Herriges, MAKING NORMAL NEIGHBORHOODS LEGAL AGAIN (2019).
85

This is only conjecture and in need of legal review.

86

https://minneapolis2040.com/topics/housing/.
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Right-Sizing Housing Supply in Growing Markets
Crudely, there three kinds of markets:


Those that are growing faster than the national average and in which
seniors are unlikely to face short sales;



Those that are growing albeit unevenly with potentially large swaths of
weak submarkets especially at the suburban fringe; and



Those that are stagnating or declining, perhaps facing devastating
losses.

I am not worried (much) about robust markets except that their supply of
senior-friendly housing needs to be increased perhaps in ways already underway in
some cities and states. I will focus here on the middle market here and then weak
markets next.
Just because a market is growing does not mean its housing stock matches
market demand at the present time or may not meet emerging demand for years or
even decades.
Moreover, growing markets are not usually growing everywhere. Older
areas, especially suburbs built for one kind of household—those with children, and
with few housing choices—may be the most at risk to being able to sell their home
for a reasonable price lest they choose to age in place perhaps involuntarily. 87 I will
focus on locally weak markets in otherwise regionally growing ones.
There are two overall strategies in these markets: Make more efficient use
of the existing stock of housing, and retrofit urban landscapes, especially suburbs,
to meet people’s increasing demand for more livable communities.

87

This is a loaded proposition because after all what is “reasonable”? I will not define it here but
offer a framework. It would be the price a household paid within the past two decades (more or
less). I estimate that in most metropolitan areas, housing values have not increased near ot
certainly not greater than inflation for decades. (Anecdotally, we sold our home on a half-acre in
“Dunwoody,” a desirable suburb of Atlanta, Georgia, in 2002 that Zillow estimates may be worth
about what we sold it for nearly 20 years earlier.) Also, the sensible seller would include
concessions if there is deferred maintenance. Finally, economists consider home ownership a form
of rent such that the total money paid for mortgages, taxes, insurance, maintenance and upgrades
would be roughly equivalent to the rent that would have been paid anyway. However, to the
extent that a home sale generates return net of all costs, this can be considered reasonable outcome
though perhaps not reasonable to the seller.
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I noted earlier that millions of homes appear to have “excess” bedrooms
(admittedly open to interpretation by the household). Table 14 provides another
angle. As the age of the householder increases, so does the average space occupied
per person with those 65 years of age and over occupying by far the largest amount
of space. Remember earlier when I mentioned that the supply of “plex” housing
was falling and that as a class it was also the oldest? In fact, a very large share of
plex housing is housing built for one generation that was converted to meet the
housing needs of the next. This was because early zoning laws in many cities
allowed multiplex residential units in most if not all low density residential areas. 88
Legislation by Minneapolis and Oregon in 2009 essentially return much
residential zoning to what it was before the 1950s. An example of efforts that can
be expected elsewhere is Seattle. Receiving no national attention—being outshown by Minneapolis and Oregon, on July 1, 2019, the Seattle City Council
adopted an ordinance that went into effect immediately. Key features include: 89






Increasing the allowed size of backyard cottages from 800 square feet
to 1,000 square feet;
Adds an additional 1-2 feet in building height thereby allowing for more
usable space in the units’ interiors;
Allowing two accessory dwelling units (ADUs) on a property instead of
one resulting in a total of three units through a combination of new units
within the house and a separate detached unit;
Eliminating the rule that a property owner has to live somewhere on site;
and
Removing an off-street parking requirement, potentially lowering the
total cost of building new ADUs.

The city estimates that these changes will increase supply of what are
locally called “backyard cottages” by about 2,400 units within a decade and
decrease the projected number of teardowns of existing homes by about 450 units.

88

See Daniel Herriges, MAKING NORMAL NEIGHBORHOODS LEGAL AGAIN (2019),
retrieved April 24, 2020 from https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2019/7/3/making-normalneighborhoods-legal-again.
89

See COUNCILMEMBER O’BRIEN CELEBRATES COUNCIL VOTE TO EASE
RESTRICTIONS ON BACKYARD COTTAGES, Seattle City Council, retrieved on April 24,
2020 from https://council.seattle.gov/2019/07/01/councilmember-obrien-celebrates-council-voteto-ease-restrictions-on-backyard-cottages/.
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Table 14
Housing Space per Person by Householder Age, 2017
Householder Age

Square Feet
per Person

Under 25 years old

475

25 to 29 years old

500

30 to 34 years old

500

35 to 44 years old

520

45 to 54 years old

650

55 to 64 years old

833

65 years old and over

951

Source. American Housing Survey for 2017.

Though novel in the present era, cities such as Minneapolis and Seattle and
states such as Oregon, Virginia and Washington90 may be followed by much of
America soon. These policies can aid seniors in a number of ways that allow them
to age in place responsibly. Underused parts of homes can be used by other
households who themselves pay rent, provide services to the senior household, and
become eyes on the property.
Though directed at infill areas, these and related policies can be applied to
McMansions in distant, low density suburbs. I estimate that about five million
seniors live in McMansions across the U.S., mostly in suburban fringe and exurban
areas.91 In some ways these are among the most vulnerable housing for seniors

90

See Kristin Capps, WITH NEW DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, VIRGINIA SEES A PUSH FOR
DENSER HOUSING (2019), retrieved April 24, 2020 from
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/12/virginia-legislature-statewide-upzoning-law-codesordinance/602818/ and WASHINGTON STATE TO CONSIDER BAN ON SINGLE FAMILY
ZONING retrieved April 24, 2020 from https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/washington/articles/2020-02-18/washington-state-to-consider-ban-on-single-family-zoning.
91

These estimates come from Table 2, 2017 National - Rooms, Size, and Amenities - All
Occupied Units, US Census AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY.
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because on the whole the market for them is not what it was before the Great
Recession.92 One commentator observes: 93
(McMansion) Conversions would diversify the single-family
subdivisions where McMansions are usually located, creating more
choices for more people … and addressing the growing demand for
smaller, more efficient housing.
****
Apartments and condos in ex-McMansions could also appeal to
renters who can’t otherwise afford to live in suburbia — and to
Boomers who might be lonely and want communal living with
neighbors, says Dunham-Jones.
****
In 2017, former U.S. surgeon general Vivek Murthy declared that
the country was suffering from a loneliness epidemic, she notes. “A
lot of that is people living out in the middle of a big house, in the
middle of nowhere.”
There is a second area in which housing supply can be right-sized in
growing markets and that is simply making suburban landscapes more attractive
and livable. Various commentators call it “retrofitting suburbs.” 94 Key elements of
this genre of literature include recycling declining or even dead retail centers into

92

See Pamela N. Danziger, Real Estate Market Is Hot, Except At The High-End: Disruption
Coming In the Luxury Home Market, FORBES (2018), retrieved April 24, 2020 from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/04/17/real-estate-market-is-hot-except-at-thehigh-end-disruption-coming-in-the-luxury-home-market/#259690793b5a.
93

Kara Baskin, BIG, UGLY, AND GREEN: RETHINKING THE MCMANSION FOR THE
CLIMATE CHANGE ERA (2020). Retrieved April 24, 2020 from
https://expmag.com/2020/02/big-ugly-and-green-rethinking-the-mcmansion-for-the-climatechange-era/.
94

For leading examples, see Ellen Dunham-Jones, and June Williamson, RETROFITTING
SUBURBIA (2011), June Williamson, DESIGNING SUBURBAN FUTURES: NEW MODELS
FROM BUILD A BETTER BURB (2013), Arthur C. Nelson RESHAPING METROPOLITAN
AMERICA (2013), and Emily Talen, ed., RETROFITTING SPRAWL: ADDRESSING
SEVENTY YEARS OF FAILED URBAN FORM (2015).

Published by Reading Room, 2020

519

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 28

mixed use development including residential development, 95 redeveloping excess
parking into economically productive real estate, 96 reducing over-zoned supplies of
commercial land especially along commercial corridors while also adding more
residential development,97 creating “complete streets,”98 expanding rail transit to
attract mixed use development in and near transit oriented development, 99 and
expanding the supply of “missing middle housing,”100 among many other efforts.
Doing so will make suburbs attractive to those who want walkable communities
along with diverse housing choices, and especially more mobility options. The end
result is that seniors who might have been trapped in homes in unattractive
suburban locations may see their home values stabilize or improve as their
neighborhoods become more attractive to younger generations.
But what about weak markets where there is little and even negative
housing demand?

95

For instance, see Alana Semueals, A New Life for Dead Malls (2015), ATLANTIC retrieved
April 25, 2020 from https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/a-new-life-for-deadmalls/387001/.
96

For a recent assessment of this opportunity, see Tom Acitelli, Parking Lots, Once Asphalt
Wasteland, Become Golden Opportunities, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2019) retrieved April 25,
2020 from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/business/parking-lot-death-redevelopment.html
97

Perhaps the best guide for this practice is ICF International & Freedman Tung & Sasaki,
RESTRUCTURING THE COMMERCIAL STRIP: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PLANNING
THE REVITALIZATION OF DETERIORATING STRIP CORRIDORS (2015).
98

See National Complete Streets Coalition, Smart Growth America,
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/program/national-complete-streets-coalition/
99

For a multifaceted statistical analysis demonstrating these outcomes, see Arthur C. Nelson and
Robert Hibberd, The Influence of Rail Transit on Development Patterns in the Mountain MegaRegion with Implications for Transit and Land Use Planning, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
RECORD (2020.
100

See Dan Parolek with Arthur C. Nelson, MISSING MIDDLE HOUSING: THINKING BIG
AND BUILDING SMALL TO RESPOND TO TODAY’S HOUSING CRISIS (2020).
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Right-Sizing Weak Markets
Weak markets are those with stagnant or often declining growth. My
colleague, Robert Hibbard,101 and I estimate that more than 40 percent (1,241) of
U.S. counties are losing population. Another 14 percent (429 counties) are or will
become “senior dominant” where more than 75 percent of all householders are 65
years of age or older. In 2020, these counties accounted for nearly 80 million or
about a quarter (24 percent) of the nation’s 330 million residents.102 These are
places where seniors have the greatest risk of facing short-sales. What can be done?
As Draconian as it seems, one approach to addressing the senior short-sale
problem in these counties is to “right-size” housing supply by having government
agencies acquire and remove excess housing supply. The market will do this
anyway so not get ahead of what is inevitable?
This is more or less the approach used in Flint, Michigan after a General
Motors plant closed and suppliers moved out of the city. Faced with decreasing
population, increasing vacancies, declining property tax values, and blight in many
parts of the city, it acquired vacant units through tax foreclosures and then tore them
down. This had the effect of reducing excess supply relative to demand, and also
gave neighborhoods more green spaces. Eventually, supply roughly met demand
such that housing prices stabilized and in some cases increased. 103 But this still
meant thousands of households including seniors lost their entire investment in
their homes.
There is a better way.
The Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) has been
engaged in “resettlement” programs since 1954. At its heart, the program is
designed to resettle isolated communities from peripheral areas to more central ones

101

Doctoral candidate in Geography with minor in Urban Planning at the University of Arizona.

102

These figures are adapted from Woods & Poole Economics, COMPLETE ECONOMIC AND
DEMOGRAPHIC DATABASE (2020).
103

For a series of reports on this and related approaches to stabilizing neighborhoods in “rustbelt”
areas, see https://www.communityprogress.net/neighborhood-stabilization-pages-99.php.
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where publicly provided facilities and services can be more efficiently provided. 104
In its current form, NL will pay each household up to C$270,000105 to relocate from
a qualifying “sending” (my term) community to a qualifying “receiving” (my term)
community provided that at least 90 percent of the voting residents approve. 106
Given that the share of NL’s senior population has about doubled between 2000
and 2020 while its share of population under 20 has fallen by more than 60
percent,107 I suspect, though cannot confirm, that this program may be especially
attractive to seniors.108
The U.S. has similar precedence for buying out properties in targeted areas
though for different reasons relating to hazard mitigation, 109 farmland preservation,
and wetland preservation.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has three programs
that directly or indirectly acquire property in or near hazardous areas: Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP); Pre-Disaster Mitigation; and Flood Mitigation
Assistance.110 Through 2018, the HMGP, which requires an approved local
mitigation plan, has provided more than $14 billion in matching grants for:


Acquisition, demolition, relocation, reconstruction, or elevation of
homes—this program engages especially the National Flood Insurance

104

The program is not without controversy. From an objective public finance perspective, the
program estimates the extent to which resettling communities saves more money than it would
cost. More than 30,000 people representing about five percent of the total, from more than 300
communities have been resettled. For detailed reviews through the middle 1970s, see Charles
Cullum, Rural Communities in Decline: the Newfoundland Experience, EKISTICS (1976) and
RESETTLEMENT IN NEWFOUNDLAND (nd) retrieved April 25, 2020 from
https://people.uwec.edu/ivogeler/Travel/Canada/Resettlement.html. For the period into the 2010s
see ‘The Government Game’: resettlement then and now (2013), retrieved April 25, 2020 from
http://activehistory.ca/2013/06/the-government-game-resettlement-then-and-now/.
105

About US$200,000 at this writing.

106

For details, see https://www.mae.gov.nl.ca/faq/faq_relocation.html.

107

Adapted from Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0005-01 (previously CANSIM table 051-0001).

108

I do not have data to show whether relocated seniors buy or rent, or move into congregate care
facilities or with family.
109

For a review of state, local and federal relationships implementing many kinds of hazard
mitigation programs, see Thomas Ruppert, John Fergus, and Enio Russe-Garcia, Managing
Property Buyouts at the Local Level: Seeking Benefits and Limiting Harms, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW REPORTER (2018).
110

These programs are summarized in Joseph DeAngelis, Haley Briel, and Michael Lauer,
PLANNING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE (2019).
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Program with an increasing focus on mitigating future damages along
coastal areas associated with sea-level rise;


Wind, wildfire, or earthquake-related structural retrofits of residences;
and



Local mitigation of flood and drought via projects include flood storage,
green infrastructure, floodplain restoration, and related.

To at least one set of commentators:
Evidence clearly demonstrates that flood mitigation through acquisition
and demolition or relocation of buildings on at-risk properties saves money
overall for society, and is the best way to protect people and property from
harm. 111
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) operates the
Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). It enables the purchase of
farmland and wetland easements in areas meeting USDA criteria. Between 2014
and 2019, about $2.5 billion was expended to preserve nearly 400,000 acres of
land.112 The easements are not in perpetuity, however, as they expire after 30
years.113
To be sure, there are other federal acquisition and demolition programs, and
many states have their own programs. The point being made here is that billions of
dollars are already spent each year by federal agencies to acquire and even demolish
structures to preserve and in many cases expand the supply of agricultural land,
wetlands, and other open spaces.
We should not wait to foreclose abandoned homes after markers have
collapsed. Local, state and federal agencies should agree that it is in their collective
financial self-interest to identify areas where reasonable offers should be made to
buy out people’s interests in properties. These can include fire and flood hazard
areas, areas where acquisition of land can create contiguous swaths of land for
habitat and environmental enhancement, and even expansion of such working
landscapes as farms and forests that could recreate some element of the local

111

Id. Thomas Ruppert, John Fergus, and Enio Russe-Garcia at 48, footnotes excluded.

112

From https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/NRCS_RCA/reports/srpt_cp_acep.html.

113

https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/acep/.
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economic base—in many cases perhaps going back to the communities’ own
resource-based economic roots.114
Rethinking Mortgage Underwriting
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was driven largely by the collapse of the
Housing Bubble of the 2000s. It was driven firstly by local government permitting
of mostly residential development in excess of market demand. 115 This excessive
permitting was fueled in large part by subprime mortgages wherein borrowers who
otherwise could not qualify for loans116,117 failed to make payments and were
indeed foreclosed.118 The mortgage underwriting system over-reacted; in addition
to increasing oversight on subprime and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), lenders
increased underwriting requirements to levels not seen for decades. Millennials and
younger generations are now held to higher underwriting standards than their
parents or grandparents. This will naturally affect the ability of boomers to sell their
homes even in strong markets. While I cannot claim expertise in underwriting
procedures and federal housing finance policy, my review of literature suggests

114

Data from the American Housing Survey show that more than 13 million homes sit on lots
ranging from one to five acres and another three million homes sit on lots of five to 10 acres. I
estimate the total land area of these lots is roughly comparable to the state of Nebraska which is
comprised of 77,000 square miles of land. As a former planning director of a rural county, I know
first-hand that subdividing farm and forest land into small acreages reduces the supply of land for
local agriculture and forestry leading to erosion of the local resource economy.
115

These dynamics are chronicled in Arthur C. Nelson, John Travis Marshall, Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer and James C. Nicholas in MARKET DEMAND BASED PLANNING AND
PERMITTING (2017).
116

These included no credit score, no proof of ability to repay debt, and even no job. See
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis. A key element was also
fraudulent appraisals wherein an appraiser linked to a lender would offer an appraisal higher than
the market thereby allowing the lender to make a loan often higher than the market justified.
117

Our cat was actually pre-approved for a $500,000 mortgage in 2005 with better terms than my
wife and I had on our home then in Alexandria, Virginia.
118

A key element of this were adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) wherein a borrower would agree
to a below-market rate mortgage for a limited period but the rate would adjust based on a common
benchmark—at the time usually the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) that was later fined
for rigging rates (see https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/18/libor-scandal-thebankers-who-fixed-the-worlds-most-important-number). As ARMs rose, in some cases from a 3.0
percent annual percentage rate to many times more, higher mortgage payments could not be
serviced thereby triggering foreclosures and leading in large part to financial meltdown (see
https://www.britannica.com/topic/adjustable-rate-mortgage).
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several actions that can be taken soon to increase the supply of potential buyers for
senior homes.
One solution is relaxing mortgage underwriting requirements in ways that
do not lead to subprime lending, ARMs and the like. Thankfully, by the 2020s this
might be happening in earnest.119
Another is changing conventional mortgage lending ratios. The Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) has been a leader in this since the Great Depression.
Born in 1934, it provides insurance to lenders covering the difference between a 20
percent down payment and what actually offered as a down payment—as low as
five percent then and zero in later years. Though attractive to them, banks needed
to relax their lending standards which were then usually 50 percent down with 10
years to pay off the balance. FHA was a game changer in the U.S. mortgage market.
By the 2020s, FHA allows down payments as low as 3.5 percent with
moderate, though not high, credit scores. But it also requires mortgage insurance
equaling the difference between what a 20 percent down payment would have been
and the actual down payment. This can raise costs to the buyer. But debt thresholds
have changed from 30 percent debt-to-income ratio to up to 43 percent, allowing
more people to assume higher home mortgages and associated costs. 120
In many markets, however, FHA’s mortgage limits are too low especially
in areas where the Great Senior Short-Sale may be most pronounced. In 2020 for
“low cost” areas the FHA mortgage limit was $331,760 but it was $765,600 in
“high cost” ones.121 While the low cost limit may be reasonable for Manhattan,
Kansas, home of Kansas State University,122 the high cost it is not reasonable for
Los Angeles, California.123 What this also means for many high costs areas is that
seniors may not be able to sell their homes to younger generations because of FHA
limits, though there are other lending sources albeit usually at higher cost. For the
benefit of both seniors who will be wanting to sell their homes perhaps by the
millions annually beginning in the 2020s, and the younger generations who may
want to buy them, FHA limits should be raised.
119

For example, see https://www.housingwire.com/articles/fha-va-join-fannie-freddie-in-relaxingappraisal-and-income-verification-standards/ and
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/mortgages/fha-loan-requirements.
120

For current underwriting standards, see https://www.fha.com/fha_loan_requirements retrieved
April 25, 2020.
121

From https://www.fha.com/fha_article?id=2854 retrieved April 25, 2020.

122

My first academic position.

123

Where our daughter lives and cannot afford to buy a home even with her parent’s help.
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On the other hand, it is important to note that FHA’s limit for 4-plexes in
high cost areas was $1,472,550 in 2020. Inasmuch as younger generations have
household sizes that are smaller than older ones, and that larger homes may be
converted into multiple residential units by-right in a growing number of cities and
states—up to 4-plexes in some cases, one can imagine the combination of new laws
and FHA loan limits could soften some of the short sale concern. That said, many
markets remain out of reach of even these higher FHA loan limits for multiplex
units and they should be raised.
There is another phenomenon: the use of innovative technologies to disrupt
mortgage processing. For instance, many online real estate listing services that are
free to the public include the opportunity for home owners to sell directly to them
thereby avoiding real estate commissions and other costs 124 as well as buying
homes directly from them.125 In some states, there are services that include a
comparatively low flat fee for listing homes, virtual home tours, thousands of
dollars in closing costs refunds, and efficient access to prospective mortgage
lenders.126 In fact, in 2019, about a third of all home buyers bought their homes
“sight unseen.”127 Despite improving market efficiency and reducing costs, many
of these technologies are not allowed in many states but need to be.
These disruptions combined with more flexible mortgage underwriting and
changing attitudes about single-family detached residential zoning can help stave
off the Great Senior Short-Sale, but will they be enough?

124

One service is Zillow.com. See https://www.zillow.com/z/offers/faq/.

125

Zillow.com offers this service as well. See https://www.zillow.com/marketing/zillow-ownedhomes/.
126

For example, Homie services markets in Arizona, Nevada and Utah. See
https://www.homie.com/.
127

https://www.aceableagent.com/blog/its-true-people-are-buying-homes-sight-unseen/.
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Policy Inertia Will Lead Us to the Great Senior Short Sale
The top-rated television program in the 1950s was I Love Lucy, airing from
1951 through 1957.128 It was about a couple living in New York City (Manhattan)
who later had a son. The family with their boomer child moved to the suburbs near
the end of the last season. Leave it to Beaver (1957-1963),129 the Donna Reed Show
(1958-66)130 and My Three Sons (1960-1975)131 followed the Lucy show and were
all about boomer children being raised in the suburbs. 132 And then came Friends
(1994-2004), a top-rated program that was all about non-boomers choosing to live
in the city.133 Over its 10 seasons, none of the characters partnered, had children,
moved to the suburbs or bought a house or a car.
Therein lies the challenge. It is not that Friends was about Gen Xers’
rejection of boomers’ life path but that Friends imprinted on millions of millennials
who followed them over a decade extending across their formative childhoods.134
Then came the Great Recession that derailed millennials’ careers and stacked the
economic deck against them.135 Along the way, millennials’ and younger
generations’ views about lifestyle, social interaction, community livability and
even the function of homes diverged from those of boomers or even Gen Xers.
Though an over-statement, it is as though the kind of large homes on large lots in
isolated, uniformly designed suburbs sought by boomers is exactly what millennials
and perhaps Gen Zers eschew.
As Professor Myers has predicted and I have amplified, there will be a
mismatch in what boomers as seniors want to sell and what younger generations
128

For a review, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Love_Lucy.

129

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leave_It_to_Beaver.

130

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Donna_Reed_Show.

131

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Three_Sons.

132

Two other popular programs, The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriett (1952-66) and Father
Knows Best (1954-60) focused on children born mostly before the Baby Boom era. See,
respectively, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Adventures_of_Ozzie_and_Harriet and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Father_Knows_Best.
133

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friends. The cast is comprised mostly of Gen Xers.

134

One can only imagine the effect Friends had on the impressionable, developing minds of
millions of millennials who followed it perhaps religiously. I am not alone; for an elaboration, see
https://exploringyourmind.com/friends-defined-a-generation/.
135

See Daniel Kurt, HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECTED MILLENNIALS (2018),
retrieved April 26, 2020 from https://www.investopedia.com/insights/how-financial-crisisaffected-millennials/.
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want. There is also the troubling prospect that there will simply be no market for
millions of seniors’ homes across large swaths of the American landscape—
including the fringes of otherwise growing regions. There is a difference between
aging-in-place voluntarily if one has the means and aging- in-place involuntarily
because one has limited choices.
There is certainly important progress along many fronts. There is a small
though perhaps growing movement to write single-family detached zoning off the
proverbial books. There are efforts to expand mobility options and in other ways
retrofit suburbs to be more attractive to younger generations. And though there is
growing flexibility in mortgage financing, punitive post-Great Recession mortgage
policies still remain and have starved a whole generation of their appetite to buy
homes.
More broadly, we need to rethink the role of the Federal Housing Act of
1949136 in meeting the nation’s housing needs. Perhaps Congress can adopt a suite
of carrots and sticks to encourage state and local governments to increase housing
supply in ways noted above as well as address imminent senior short sales in weak
markets. That is a separate conversation, however.
All these strategies and more are needed to dampen the impact of the
imminent Great Senior Short Sale. Every year of delay undermines the ability of
millions of seniors to prepare for it. In the end, we cannot let policy inertia short
change millions of America’s seniors.
Tribute to Julian Juergensmeyer
I want to conclude my Festschrift contribution with a tribute to Julian
Juergensmeyer. I owe a very large share of my career success to him, as well as to
Jim Nicholas, who has been our colleague in so many ventures along with being a
great friend. Julian has been an inspiration for new thinking, a sounding board for
emerging ideas some of which were wisely laid to rest, and an audience for
scholarship. For two decades, his Urban Fellows program at the Georgia State
University Law School allowed me to share works in progress with leaders in
policy, research, and law. Many of the keenest critiques offered during those
presentations came from Julian himself. Over my career, his counsel has improved
the publication of several books and countless articles, honed other professional
presentations, and enhanced lectures to my own students. I have been fortunate to
include Julian Juergensmeyer as a colleague and above all a friend.
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Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 81-171.
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